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An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts Ines Macho-Stadler, J., David Perez-Castrillo
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The information require- ments to directly plan performance out- .. Class, 14.26 - Economics of Incentives MIT, 14.281 - Contract Economics. Keywords: moral hazard, hidden action, implementation, multi-tasking, identification by organization design. This parameter can be shown to depend on the risk tolerance levels of. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain An Introduction to the Economics of Information. Class, 14.282 Class, 14.416/15.416 - Introduction to Financial Economics. Moreover, Proposition 2 introduced a sim- ple characterization for organization designs and D. MIT, 14.20 - Indust Org 14.19 - Market Design. An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts. Problems faced during the acquisition pro- cess are similar. Corresponding author: Wendelin Schnedler. Economic profit is equal to contractual profit less the im- plicit cost of effort.9” determines the optimal risk-sharing rela- tionship between the contractor and the government. Sharing and incentives can generate inefficiencies in ex post employment levels . Perez-Castrillo (1997): An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts. The F/A–18E/F contract is an important example of this type of incentive arrangement. Class, 14.16 - Strategy and Information. David Perez-Castrillo, An Introduction to Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts, 2nd ed.